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without having obtained a permit as is herein required, or without complying 
with the provisions of this chapter, or in violation of or variance from the 
terms of any such permit. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to and be 
binding upon all property owners, developers, agents, contractors or employees 
engaged in activities regulated by this chapter. (Ord. 1-2-96, 1-18-1996). 
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conditions permit, the public works encroachment officer may by written 
approval, permit closing of streets and alleys to all traffic for a period of time 
prescribed by him, if in his opinion it is necessary. Such written approval may 
require that the permittee give notification to various public agencies and to 
the general public. In such cases, such written approval shall not be valid until 
such notice is given. 
E. Advance Warning: Warning signs shall meet MUTCD standards and be 
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placed far enough in advance of the construction operation to alert traffic 
within a public street, and cones or other approved devices shall be placed to 
channel traffic, in accordance with the instructions of the public works 
encroachment officer. (Ord. 79-5-4,5-3-1979, eff. 7-1-1979; amd. 2003 Code) 
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Any person, firm or corporation making any excavation or tunnel in or under 
any public street, alley or other public place in the city where no pavement 
exists, shall immediately upon completion of the project restore the surface to 
its original condition. Additionally, any opening in a paved or improved 
portion of a street shall immediately, upon completion of the project, be 
repaired and the surface relaid by the applicant. All work site restoration as 
required by this section shall comply with all ordinances of the city, the city 
standard specifications for design and construction, any requirements set forth 
by the public works encroachment officer in issuance of the permit, and under 
supervision of the director of public works, and shall include, but not be 
limited to, repair, cleanup, backfilling, compaction and stabilization, paving 
and other work necessary to place the site in an acceptable condition following 
the conclusion of the work or the expiration or revocation of the permit. (Ord. 
1-2-96, 1-18-1996; amd. 2003 Code). 
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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (as amended 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The proper issue before this Court is much broader than that stated by Appellant: 
ISSUE #1: 
The first issue is whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment based 
upon its finding that Plaintiff/Appellant, Jule Kreyling, failed to establish that any duty of 
care was breached by the City of St. George and further, whether the District Court was 
correct in its analysis that summary judgment was proper because reasonable minds could 
not differ in the conclusion that the evidence adduced by Kreyling was simply insufficient 
to sustain his legal claim. See Rose v. Provo City, 61 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) 
(quoting Lamarr v. UDOT, 828 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah Ct App. 1992) andFerre v. State, 784 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)). There is simply no issue for trial unless there is sufficient 
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a favorable verdict. Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242,249 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summaryjudgment is appropriate. Id. at 250, see also AMSSaltlnd., 
Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utahl997). Such conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632, 635 (Utah 2002) (citations 
omitted); R. 655, Transcript of Hearing, Appellee's Addendum "A" at pg. 23; R.615, Order 
Granting Summary Judgment at pg. 2, Appellee's Addendum "B." 
ISSUE #2: 
The second issue is whether the District Court properly granted summaryjudgment 
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based upon its finding that the Plaintiff presented no probative evidence that St. George City 
had created or had actual or constructive notice of a defect in the park strip. See Fishbaugh 
v. Utah Power & Light, 969?.2d 403 (Utah 1998) (Plaintiff must present evidence of notice 
and an opportunity to remedy a defect to survive summary judgment); Goebel v. Salt Lake 
City Southern Railroad Co., 104 P.3d. 1185, 1194 (Utah 2004) (evidence of notice and a 
reasonable time to remedy are required to survive summary judgment or directed verdict). 
Such conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Id. R. 655, Transcript of Hearing, Appellee's 
Addendum "A" at pg. 23; R.615, Order Granting Summary Judgment at pg. 2, Appellee's 
Addendum "B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below-
Jule Kreyling, Plaintiff and Appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as "Kreyling"), 
filed a Complaint on or about July 8, 2005, alleging he sustained personal injury when he 
stepped into a hole located on the park strip when he went for lunch at the St. George Senior 
Center. R.002. The property and the St. George Senior Center, owned and operated by 
Washington County ("County"), abuts the St. George City ("City") property which includes 
the sidewalk, park strip, gutter and road. Kreyling named the City, in his Complaint, as the 
owner of the park strip where the hole was alleged to have been located, the County, as the 
abutting landowner for both the old Senior Center and the new Center being constructed on 
the neighboring lot, Watts Construction Company, Inc., the contractor employed by the 
County to construct the new Senior Center on the adjoining lot, also abutting the sidewalk, 
and DeMille Construction Company, the subcontractor who installed the water lines and 
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removed any and all meter boxes. R.044, 027, 036, 264. Kreyling settled with Defendants 
Washington County, Watts Construction and DeMille Construction. R.601, 605, 622, 625. 
The City was dismissed on summary judgment. R. 615; Transcript of Summary Judgment 
Hearing, attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum "A," and Order Granting the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order"), attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum "B." 
Kreyling alleged in his Complaint that the City had created an artificial condition on the 
premises and/or knew about a dangerous condition, or failed to discover the dangerous 
condition through the exercise of reasonable care. R.004. 
At summary judgment, Kreyling presented the same evidence and arguments to the 
District Court that he now presents in his Brief. The District Court held: 
The Court finds there is no probative evidence that the City of 
St. George created the defect or condition in the park strip, or 
knew or should have known of any defect or condition. 
Therefore, the court hereby grants Defendant City's motion for 
summary j udgment. 
R. 616; Order, Appellee's Addendum "B." 
B. Statement of Facts 
L Kreyling testified that he and his wife went for lunch at Washington County's 
St. George Senior Center ("Center") "two, three, sometimes four times per week." R.476 
(Kreyling Deposition at 20-21); See also Appellant's Addendum A. 
2. On the date of the incident, Kreyling parked his car along the curb near the 
Center and next to a walkway that bridged the gutter and curb. R.476 (Id. at 18:19-25, 19: 
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1-2,21:18-20). Plaintiff had parked in the same location dozens of times. R.481 (Id. at 39:4,* 
47:5). 
3. There were one or two of these walkways bridging the gutter culverts and 
Kreyling would always try to park near one, then walk around the vehicle to open his wife's 
door. R.477,478,480 (Id, at 23:15-23,25:16-20,26:1-2,27:21,36:10; 39:23); Photographs 
of driveway ramp, R342,345, 561; See also Photographs attached as Appellee's Addendum 
"C." 
4. Kreyling believed these walkways were intended for the seniors to use when 
going into the old Center, and had yellow lines marked for crossing the street, R.479 
(Kreyling Deposition at 32:7-9, 20). 
5. According to Washington County Building Superintendent, Bob Coulter, 
parking was available in the Center parking lot, but it was partially blocked for the 
construction equipment at the building site. R514 (Coulter Deposition at 25). Parking 
around the old Center was congested. R.526 (Id. at 73). 
6. Gerald Newton, who volunteers at the Center five days a week Monday 
through Friday, including lunch time, testified that the Center patrons parked in the street 
regardless of whether there was parking available in the parking lot. R.494 (Newton 
Deposition at 20), R.479 (Kreyling Deposition at 33:14-16). 
7. Newton testified he considered the location where Kreyling parked to be 
unsuitable for parking because of the construction, particularly in light of the fact that 
alternative parking was available both in the Center parking lot and at the neighboring 
church. R494-495 (Newton Deposition at 21-22). 
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8. Kreyling was aware of the parking lot, but preferred to park on the street 
because it was "easier to get in and out." R. 477 (Kreyling Deposition at 22:17-25, 23:1-9, 
132:12-19, and Addendum "A" to Appellant's Brief at 138-139). 
9. Sometime in September or early October, Kreyling and his wife went to the 
Center for lunch, parking along the curb near the construction site for the new Senior Center. 
R.481 (Kreyling Deposition at 22:24-25, 38:24-25, 23:1-9, 31-32, 39:1, 52:11-16, 57:24). 
10. Kreyling did not want his wife to walk on the dirt, but he parked in front of 
the Center next to the construction site instead of in the parking lot because there was no 
fence or cones around the construction. R.477,479,481 (Kreyling Deposition at 22,23,32, 
41). 
1L Kreyling testified that he parked his vehicle parallel to the curb and roughly 
even to a walkway and walked around the car to open the door for his wife; he stepped 
backwards and into a hole in the park strip at the comer of the curbing and the ramp. R479 
(Id. 31-32). 
12. Kreyling testified that when he had previously parked in this location, he had 
never seen a hole, or any other obvious hazard. R.481 (Id. at 35:15-16 at 38:13-14, 39:8-9, 
40:8-9,41:13-14). 
13. Kreyling testified that prior to his fall, he did not see a hole and distinctly 
remembered "leaves and stuff," such as cobwebs, lying on the ground where he stepped in 
ahole "up to his groin." R.317, 480-481 (Id. at 35:6-19, 52:11-16). 
14. On October 9, 2003, Kreyling signed an incident report indicating the fall 
occurred on September 24 or 25,2003. R.330-333,485-486 (Id. at 57-58:23-11 and Exhibits 
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"E" and "F" to MS J memorandum). On October 13, 2003, he signed another form, entitled 
"Client's Report of Accident" citing the date of his fall as October 10,2003. R.317,330-331 
(Deposition of Kreyling at 18:19-20, 52:14-17, 86:12-25). 
15. Kreyling testified that he and his son took photographs of the area 
approximately two to three weeks after his fall, but also after the area had been fully 
excavated. R.293, 301, 302, 304, 305, 505, 506, Addendum "A" Kreyling Deposition at 
27:7,29:16-21,132:21-25,134:1-3,140:14-15. According to Curtis DeMille, the sidewalk, 
curb and gutter were excavated on November 19, 2003. R.238 (DeMille Deposition, 
certificate of corrections pg. 51). 
16. In preparation for the new Senior Center, and approximately a year before 
construction began, Washington County purchased several homes at the site of the planned 
"new" Center, removed the homes and leveled the site for construction. R.335,312-15,318 
(Coulter Deposition at 26,32,37-39,56). Washington County prepared the site before Watts 
Construction arrived to begin work. R.338 (Watts Deposition at 7:14-18). 
17. Before construction began, the area where the "hole" was located was a park 
strip with lawn. R.328 (Newton Deposition 24); R.335, 343, 562-64 (Photographs of Pre-
existing Homes); see also Photographs at Appellee's Addendum "C." 
18. At one time there had been two driveways crossing the sidewalk and gutter and 
entering the road from the homes removed by Washington County. R.317,521, 520 (Coulter 
Deposition at 51, 56-7); Photographs of pre-existing homes, R. 343, 562-564 and 
photographs at Appellee's Addendum "C." 
19. Washington County excavated and removed one of these driveways early on 
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in its process of leveling and preparing the site for construction of the new Center. R.317, 
520 (Coulter Deposition at 57); Photograph R.561, and Photographs included with 
Appellee's Addendum "C." 
20. It is the remaining driveway ramp Kreyling has identified as the "walkway" he 
used when he and his wife went for lunch at the Center. R.292-93, 477-478 (Kreyling 
Deposition at 25-27). 
21. The records indicate Watts Construction began its work at the site several 
months prior to Kreyling's fall, in April or May 2003. R.322 (Coulter Deposition at 78). 
22. Washington County and/or Watts Construction and/or DeMille Construction 
excavated the sidewalk where Plaintiff typically tried to park near the "walkway" or 
driveway ramp. R.310, 513 (Coulter Deposition at 19). 
23. Mr. Coulter testified that the County's standard procedure during a construction 
project is to fence the area as a safety precaution to prevent people from entering the 
construction site. R.310, 513 (Coulter Deposition at 19); R.345-46, 561 (Photographs of 
Construction Site). 
24. Representatives of Washington County and the Center do not recall whether 
they ever erected a fence in the area of the accident and any fence that might have been 
installed, would have been removed when the sidewalk, curb and gutter were excavated 
because the construction company was "doing all of the dirt moving." R.310, 513 (Coulter 
Deposition at 20-21); R.326, 493 (Newton Deposition at 15). 
25. Washington County employee Bob Coulter testified that at the time of this 
incident, it was Washington County's practice to request an encroachment permit number 
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from the City without completing an application and without saving documentation of the 
encroachment permits. R.320 (Deposition of Bob Coulter at 63-65). However, in this case, 
Washington County failed to request or obtain an encroachment permit or number to dig on 
the City's property. R.320 (Coulter Deposition 62-65). 
26. Washington County removed the existing sewer, water lines, and gas lines 
during site preparation. R.321 (Id. at 71:13-19). 
27. Defendant Curtis DeMille Construction was a subcontractor hired by Watts 
Construction to install water lines to the new Senior Center and to excavate and remove the 
curb, gutter and sidewalk and parkway. R.339, 551-52, 367-380 (Watts Deposition 12:21-
23); R. 354-55, 551-52 (DeMille Deposition at 7-8:23-2,21:17-23,22:12). DeMille began 
its work in November 2003. R.238 (DeMille certificate of corrections, pg. 51). 
28. Curtis DeMille testified that prior to the excavation, he was required to submit 
an application for an encroachment permit which included a "flagging plan" to demonstrate 
where the contractor intended to put up warnings or barriers around the site. R358-59 
(DeMille Deposition at 37:21-22, 38:2-11). 
29. Any meters in the park strip would have been removed, capped and the holes 
filled by DeMille Construction. R. 356, 553 (Id. at 28:2-10, 29:11-14). However, Curtis 
DeMille testified he did not recall removing anything from the site identified by Kreyling and 
saw no "holes" in that area. R.354, 356, 550, 553. (Id. 26:5-7, 16-17:18-4). 
30. Any posts removed at the accident site were removed by Washington County. 
R.360, 558 (Id. at 46:12-14). 
31. Bob Coulter testified that he knew the City had not removed a power pole from 
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the area Kreyling states he fell; similarly Dennis Jorgensen, Power Systems Operations 
Manager for the City, averred that the telephone pole currently installed at the location where 
Kreyling indicates he fell has been in the same location since 1985 and no other power pole 
has been moved or removed at that location. R.315, R.348-49. (Coulter Deposition at 40:20-
23); R.348-49 (Affidavit of Dennis Jorgensen at pg. 2). 
32. Curtis DeMille testified that DeMille Construction was contracted to excavate 
on City property and to remove the park strip, as well as any and all meters located in that 
area. R.548, 553 (DeMille Deposition at 7-8:23-2, 28:8-9). Bob Coulter testified a meter 
would not be located where Kreyling indicated he fell. R.319,3 66 (Photograph with Kreyling 
pointing), 521 (Coulter Deposition 60-61:24-3). 
33. Bob Coulter testified that he inspected the area where Kreyling fell and did not 
see a definite hole, only a "dished out" area. R.511-512 (Id. at 11-12:12-9,13:15-20,14:1-8, 
17:5-11). 
34. Gerald Newton, a volunteer at the Center testified that he had never seen a 
"hole" in the park strip prior to Kreyling's fall. R.492 (Newton Deposition at 12-13:21-2). 
Following Kreyling's fall, Newton looked at the area and found a hole that appeared to be 
about nine inches deep near the curb. R.492 (Id, atlO-11:21-15, 13:8-9). There had been 
some digging in the area, "they had done something to take the dirt out" R.494 (Id. at 18:9-
21). 
3 5. According to the testimony of Curtis DeMille, there were no holes or anything 
out of the ordinary between the curb and gutter and the sidewalk in the area identified by 
Kreyling and no water or sewer line would cause the shape of the hole or impression 
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Kreyling described. R. 354, 357, 550, 554 (DeMille Deposition at 16-17, 32:17-20). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Kreyling has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he fell 
into a hole located in the park strip at the St. George Senior Center, owned and operated by 
Washington County, that the City of St. George, as the property owner of the park strip, 
created the hole, or knew or should have known that the hole or other dangerous defect 
existed at that location and sufficient time had elapsed that the City should have addressed 
the condition. However, all of the evidence available in this case confirms that the persons 
who frequented the Center, including employees of Washington County, volunteers at the 
Center, the contractor for the County construction project, Watts Construction and his 
subcontractor, DeMille Construction, saw no "hole" in the location identified by Kreyling 
either before or following his fall. Kreyling himself testified that he parked in the same 
location "dozens" of times prior to his fall and never saw a hole in the park strip. Further, 
Washington County and Watts Construction confirm that they did not obtain the required 
encroachment permits, or otherwise notify the City of their intention to dig in the park strip 
or excavate on City property. There is simply no evidence that the City was aware of any 
holes or defects in the park strip, or that the City was notified by the County of its excavation 
in the park strip to remove one of the driveways. The evidence also establishes that the 
County utilized the property for law enforcement exercises, erecting barricades at the site just 
about a year before the incident at issue in this case. Appellee's Addendum "C," photographs 
showing pre-existing home and law enforcement officers. A summary judgment movant must 
show, by reference to "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any" that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56( c). "Once the movant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to 
the nonmoving party, who may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, 
but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Orvis v. 
Johnson, 111 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008). "Failure to produce acceptable evidence demonstrating 
a genuine issue of material fact will result in a grant of summary judgment." Utah Local 
Govt Trust v. Wheeler Mack Co., 154 P.3d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). 
Kreyling presented absolutely no facts or evidence in support of his allegation that the 
City created a hole, or that it knew or should have known of the existence of a hole or other 
defect in the park strip. Utah law is clear, "when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or 
insufficiently established that determining the legal issue becomes completely speculative, 
the claim fails as a matter of law." AMSSaltlnd., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 
P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997). "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence 
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. "If the evidence 
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). The district court Order 
provides: 
[T]he Court finds there is no probative evidence that the City of 
St. George created the defect or condition in the park strip, or 
knew or should have known of any defect or condition. The 
court noted "I'm satisfied on the basis of this record that, as a 
matter of law, under these facts one cannot stretch liability to the 
City of St. George. 
R.616 (Order granting summary judgment at pg. 2), Appellee's Addendum "B," R.655 
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(Transcript of hearing at 23:13-16), Appellee's Addendum "A.*' The district court's findings 
and Order Granting Summary Judgment are clearly supported by the evidence, and summary 
judgment in favor of the City should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. KREYLING FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
HIS CLAIM THAT THE CITY IS LIABLE FOR INJURY AS THE 
LANDOWNER OF THE PARK STRIP, 
A. There is No Evidence the City Created or Had Notice of a Defect. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently iterated the requirements for a plaintiff to survive 
summary judgment on a claim for injuries resulting from a defect located on the defendant's 
premises. Goebel v. Salt Lake Southern R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185 (Utah 2004). If a plaintiff 
alleges a defendant negligently failed to remedy a dangerous condition the defendant did not 
create, "[i]t is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that 
liability results therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the 
condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition 
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, 
sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied i t" 
Id. (citing to Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996)). Evidence of 
notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion for summary 
judgment or directed verdict. Goebel, 104 P.3d at 1195, These requirements do not apply 
where the negligence claim requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant actually 
created the dangerous condition or purposefully built the dangerous condition into the system 
for which the defendant is responsible. Id. The Goeble court noted the rationale behind the 
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distinct rules is that it is reasonable to presume a party has notice of a condition the party 
itself creates, but it is not reasonable to presume notice of a condition someone else creates. 
Id. 
In this case, there is no evidence the City was responsible for creating a defective 
condition or hole that caused Kreyling to fall or step into it. Kreyling argued at summary 
judgment that the photographs taken by him confirm that "a half circle [was] cut out of the 
driveway that went around something that once was there that became a hole." R.649, 505, 
305; Transcript of Hearing at 17:19-20, Appellee's Addendum "A"; and photograph of 
plaintiff and excavation at Appellee's Addendum "C." In his Brief, Kreyling argues that the 
semi-circle was present when the driveway was poured. Appellant's Brief at 18. However, 
he has presented no evidence of even when the private driveway was poured, what the object 
might have been, when it was placed, when it was removed or by whom, or whether the 
defect in the concrete is related in any way to a hole. Indeed, Kreyling has presented no one 
to confirm the cause of his fall, or the presence of the hole he describes. 
The evidence shows the County purchased the homes in this area and utilized them 
for various activities prior to tearing them down. R.520-21, 562-64; Coulter Deposition at 
49, 51, 52, Photographs of pre-existing homes WC005, 008-9, Appellee's Addendum "C." 
Sometime in late 2002 or early 2003, the County tore the houses down, removing one of the 
driveways all the way to the curb. R.335, 312-15, 318, 338, 515, 517, 520 561-64; Id. at 
26:17-20, 37:3-6, 57:4-14; Photographs of pre-existing homes and excavation by County, 
Appellee's Addendum "C." The County removed all shrubbery and fencing. Id. Gerald 
Newton, a volunteer at the Center, testified that the County had been "digging" in the park 
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strip, "they had done something to take the dirt out." R.494 (Newton Deposition at 18:9-21). 
Further, Nolan Gardner, the City Water District Superintendent averred that neither the 
County nor Watts Construction ever notified the City that they would be excavating in the 
park strip. R.363. He also averred that the City did not dig in the park strip. R.364. Dennis 
Jorgensen, the City Power Systems Operations Manager, averred that no power poles had 
been moved or removed from the location identified by Kreyling and the pole located in the 
park strip where Kreyling fell was installed in 1985 and has not be removed since that time. 
R.349. 
The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.: 
[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence 
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for 
that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not 
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. 
477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
Similarly, there is no evidence the City had "notice" of a defect. Id. "It is quite 
universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the landowner so that liability results 
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, 
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long 
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it." Goebel, 104 P.3d 
at 1195. Evidence of notice and a reasonable time to remedy are required to survive a motion 
for summary judgment or a directed verdict. Id. 
Kreyling argues that, because there is a semi-circle in the driveway, the City must 
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have had notice of a hole. Appellant's Brief at 18. However, in order for a jury to reach the 
conclusion that a hole had existed in the park strip since the driveway was poured, it would 
also have to speculate regarding when the driveway was poured, what it contained, when and 
who removed the "whatever" that was in the hole and finally, that when the County 
excavated in the park strip to remove the second driveway, it didn't disturb the soil around 
the alleged hole. However, the appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed that where "jurors 
would have to engage in rank speculation to reach a verdict, summary judgment is proper." 
Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business Dist., 126 P.3d 781, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
(citation and quotations omitted). 
The parties conducted exhaustive discovery. Summary judgment was filed only after 
discovery was closed. There is absolutely no evidence the City had any knowledge that a 
hole existed, much less evidence of when the hole was created. The County used and 
excavated the property without notifying the City of its activities. Coulter testified the 
County did not apply for either an encroachment permit or a number. The evidence shows 
that Watts Construction never applied for an encroachment permit. The evidence shows the 
County failed to barricade the area even during excavation of the park strip. Moreover, the 
evidence makes clear Kreyling was aware of the construction activities in the area. R.481 
(Kreyling Deposition at 38:9-11, 38-39:17-12, Appellant's Addendum "A"). Kreyling 
testified that he did not want his wife to walk on the dirt because she was having trouble with 
herlegsR.476-77,481 (Id. at21:21-25,23:18-23,41:l,),andhe knew there was alternative 
parking with handicap access in the lot. R.477 (Id. at 22). Yet he elected to encounter the 
potential hazard because he had parked there dozens of times in the past and had "never 
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noticed" the hole. R.481 {Id, at 39:Vj. there is no evidence to support Kreyiing's 
hypothesis. 
hi (/ivA('7, flic pliiiiiliil alleged that llie defendant railroad was responsible for his 
bicycle accident because it 1 ailed to inspect and discover a "gap" al the crossing near the rail. 
The evidence showed that the area liau Dcen HISJ^CCIC: • --pot t : 1 - l •• ••• • »f-
.-:'••' . . -UK' numerous times before the accident and the court lound 
he should have been auuned io potential bicycle safety issues andhadl.hiv-J to nonce me gap 
himseil. (/^v,*, . .;. • . :* ' • - t V* ibe plaintiff 
alle J ' K:i'' : ; e i V had failed to inspect and maintain a sidewalk that collapsed while he 
was on it. Moloney, 262 P.2d 281, 282 (Utah 1953). The court affirmed a OL: J.ICO 
in ia\or oi ;:;. , !i; •:••!] M.- :.;.IUU-, .. ; ; \*t r\ •>- .' { > show that the sidewalk was 
in a defective condition before it collapsed, even though he himself had used the sidewalk 
many times prior to the accident. Id, In this case, not only did Kreyling tcslil\ lluil In: had 
parkeo in u»', ^m^ . *.w- ' . i-ut employees and volunteers testified that 
they saw no defect or hole in the park strip prior to Kreyiing's fall. In this case, Kreyling 
failed as a matter of law to present sufnciem. j.-io" it:- *"}--i".-\ i\,.j . ..!;. :.. . 
n '» " -^ - A " • K. • • -.u:!^  <«JI the sake of argument,, that the City had notice of the 
defect, Kreyling still "must present evidence ofthclcnrth nftime the defendant nao . K H ^ . 
Goebel, <• • •^^t,iu.!!!hiL> ir.. .^o-u !•. « :;"'. * 1 to speculate about 
the semi-circle in the concrete. However, there "is no evidence the "semi-circle" in the 
driveway was associated in any way with a delect in ihe paik strip .^-. n p., d.ii • *i. • > \ 
short ol vieaung a L:CL •• * ,MU , -u •• = * ^ . '' • to survive summary judgment 
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Gildea v. Guardian Title Co, of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265,1270 (Utah, 1998); Triesaultv. Greater 
Salt Lake Business Dist., 126 P.3d 781, 785 (Utah Ct. App. 2005), Clark v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 600-01 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (quotations omitted). A plaintiff may not 
rely on inference as to whether the defendant had notice of a defect and adequate time to 
remedy the situation, he must present specific probative evidence of the defect, that it caused 
the injury and the length of time it was present. Fishbaugh v. UP&L, 969 P.2d 403, 408 
(Utah 1998). The plaintiffs mere hypothesis that a defect may have existed for some 
unknown length of time does not suffice and summary judgment is appropriate. Id., Goebel, 
104P.3datl l94. 
B. The City Had No Duty to Kreyling Under the "Special Use'5 Doctrine. 
All changes and excavation in the area were undertaken or caused by the abutting 
landowner, Washington County. However, ordinarily liability will not be imposed on the 
owner of property abutting an unsafe street or sidewalk, but such liability may be imposed 
under the "special use" doctrine. Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1021 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003). 
Kreyling testified that the driveway ramps were intended for use by the senior citizens 
visiting the County owned Senior Center. R. 476-81; Appellant's Addendum A: Kreyling 
Deposition at 18:19-25, 19:1-2, 20, 21:18-20, 23:15-23, 25:16-20, 26:1-2, 27:21, 32:7-9, 
36:10,39:4-23. He testified that there were one or two of these walkways bridging the gutter 
and he would always try to park near one when he visited the Center with his wife. R.346, 
and photographs of site at Appellee's Addendum "C." County employees testified that they 
knew the patrons were parking on the street near the construction even though parking was 
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available in the lot. R.494 (Newton Deposition at 2o~22 L R 4^0, 47". It is apparent the 
driveway ramps were being used for a "special 01 umueiuk. , : - ;•• - , despite alternative 
available paiknii; 
Kreyling argues the "special use" doctrine does not diminish the City's duty to prevent 
his fall, or discover the hole next to the driveway in the park ; . •. .->i: u- »• -' ;' ] 4. 
} lowever, this argi iment is only partially accurate. Under the "special use" doctrine, liability 
for maintaining the park snip mas be transferred to the ahi:+ting iaiuiounei H ia f.uikes 
special use of the area, ka -. \\:v* .'<H)3). -
In Rose, the restaurant landowner abutting a public sidewalk and road made use of an 
asphalted planter box as a driveway. Id, The plainiili MC\VI;SI was injures ^nu. 
into a ditch, at tl le end of what appeared to be a di iveway extending into the street. The Court 
found there was sufficient evidence to find the city negligent for creating the hazard when 
it excavated the ditch thai ^ knew was being used by tin: landowner as a dri\ e\\ ay. hi 
•
:
 • :f •, i • • • /', M / w as not relieved of liability due to the negligence of 
the property owner. However, this does not accurately reflect the factual and legal findings 
in that case. i-nVi. the coi.rt \ouu,\ J^: . io -. .1, i*1^*:- <: .- ,;..-. lh. !»;.. * 
e^  irl^ncc established that the city tore up the park strip on two occasions to expose and 
replace a pipe in the ditcl l and then left the ditch exposed; thus creating the dangerous 
condition ..i.:-. p..- • •.. • . .•-• r " i - . i : .
 :. •!*. \-(lvl <tnp as a driveway 
and had photographs "accurately representing the area from 1989 to the date of Rose's 
accident in 1995, including the period during 
exposed the did li I'I ' .il I"'» '•! I he • • • - • * i.er testified that he called the city and told 
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them about the hazard and his use of the asphalted park strip as a driveway. Thus, due to the 
evidence produced by the plaintiff, the court found there was a genuine issue as to whether 
the city knew or should have known of the hazard it had created. See Goebel, 104 P.3d at 
1995. 
In this case, there is no evidence the City created any hazard. On the contrary the 
evidence supports the fact that the Senior Center invited its patrons to use the driveway 
"ramp" to access the Center and there is no evidence the City was ever advised of this use; 
the evidence also confirms that the County never advised the City of any construction or 
"digging" in the park strip to remove or alter the driveways, nor is there evidence the City 
should have been aware of the excavation in the park strip. R.326, 493-95, Newton 
Deposition at 15,20-22; R.310,320,513-14,526, Coulter Deposition at 19,20-21,25,62-65. 
Witness testimony confirms that persons who frequented the area on a daily basis saw no 
defect, no hole, "nothing out of the ordinary" prior to Kreyling's fall. Id.\ R.511-12 (Coulter 
Deposition at 11-12:12-9,13:15-20,14:1-8,17:5-11; R.492,494, Newton Deposition at 12-
13:21-2, 18:9-21; R.354, 357, 550, 554, DeMille Deposition at 16-17, 32:17-20. The 
evidence also establishes that the County used the property for law enforcement exercises, 
inserted and removed poles, fences and shrubbery from the area. R.562, Appellee's 
Addendum "C," Photographs. Finally, the evidence shows the County failed to erect any 
barricades to protect the public from the construction and/or excavation. See St. George City 
Code § 7-1-3 (encroachment permit required to erect or repair any building abutting public 
property); St. George City Code § 7-1-12 (permit required to excavate or construct a 
sidewalk, or alter a sidewalk); St. George City Code § 7-2-1 (permit required to excavate any 
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street, allc\ <v- public riaeej, St. George City Code § 7-2-7 (bairiei and warning devices are 
required for anyone cutting or making an excavation in or upon n\.: . • • :--t . • ; -.i ••aiety 
...ii'. • • ' MUC « -HI- ' ' 2 v • *n\ v\uik that includes damage or 
excavation of pubhc property shall immediately restore the condition of the site); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 confirming the mi micipal legislati v e pow er to adopt ordinances 
.IIKI i ulrs ;tII• I in " hence. ;' \. '. • ; _
 ; . . . .-:. -• .• . 
The Supreme Court held in Tripp \\ Granite Holding Co A**- r ,1 <H. n tah 
1969), that where an abutung • : * - s ^ ••• dm . >n. .-.-•.Jmon or 
sitintmn on public proper Sic is obligated to maintain and correct the condition. As the 
district court noted, "there is no probative evidence that the City created i i l c d C l C C l Iij L]i. ]\il i\ 
strip, or knew oi A\- . : : ' huci Granting Summary 
Judgment, *M: ""». "[This oourt h>] satisfied, on the basis ol this record that, as a matter of 
law, under these facts one cannot stretch lial)ih;; ; . . > - • ic in * - -
(Tninsicnul of'lieaiing al pj...1;,, 23: I \ I U) 
^ . Kreyling Knew of Alternative Available Parking Away from.. Construction 
"It is wel; - ulcii li. a i. pias.:..!; A'I )•;• Hi -i.;..M.,i ..',--..•:.• AY • 
to foresee a dar»< m ? v. nticularly one that is plainly visible and avoid, it. Deals \ \ Commercial 
Security Bank 74o P.2d * 1°1, 1104 fTTtah Ct. Apr. 198^ Kre\img admits that he was 
aware of the consiiu,., ••-• : • • - • • ••• •• :^" ; A* ] (Kreyling Deposition 
at - ^  ^ - O ^ ' H -•). ^8:24-25,31-32,39:1,52:11-10, v :24 . 132:12-1^). Indeed he testified 
that an unidentified construction worker assisted him to hi. ; ; . . - . d. at 28:0 1 I 11 
testiiiwC .::•••• ••• • '^ -.' > * ' t]- am; aid because, although he was 
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aware of the nearby construction activities, there was no fence or barricade where he parked. 
R.477, 479, 481, Id. at 22-23,32,41. He also knew that he had the option of parking in the 
Senior Center parking lot or even the nearby church parking lot with handicap access for his 
wife. R. 477, Id. at 22-23,132. If a plaintiff fails to see, or sees but fails to avoid the danger, 
then the plaintiff acted negligently. Id., see Pollesche v. K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 
520P.12d200,203 (Utah 1974); Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918,920 (Utah 1964) 
(plaintiff can be negligent either in failing to look or in failing to heed what he saw). 
II. KREYLING'S CLAIM THAT THE CITY'S INADEQUATE OR FAILED 
INSPECTION OF A PRIVATE DRIVEWAY AND/OR THE COUNTY'S 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT CAUSED HIS INJURY IS BARRED BY 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
Under the Governmental Immunity Act in the fall of 2003, immunity was waived unless the 
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from a latent dangerous or latent defective 
condition of any road, street, sidewalk, or other structure located on them. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(16)(2001)1. A "latent defect" is a defect which reasonably careful inspection will not reveal. 
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah 1978). Injuries resulting from latent defects 
in a street not due to faulty municipal work, and which could not have been discovered by ordinary 
care and diligence, do not give a right of action against the municipal corporation in the absence of 
actual or constructive notice. Id. at 105. Kreyling argues that the City should have known about the 
hole, if it had inspected the private driveway when it was poured, or inspected the County's 
construction project for compliance with the City's building and safety ordinances. 
However, Kreyling has presented no evidence to suggest that the "hole" of which he 
complains was even present prior to when he stepped on the site, or whether it was possible to 
^he Governmental Immunity Act version applicable at the time of Plaintiff s accident. 
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discover the hole upon any inspection. Indeed, Kreyling himself testified that he had parked in this 
same ioLahoi, " JO/LT. - ' . \ - " iu - , . A ^ .•
 A i-olc, nor did he see 
ahole on the date of the accident. R.480-82; Kreyling Deposition 35:15-16,38:10-14, 39:4-9,40:8-
0
 4i-1 . , ^ . , - , - . - . : - ; : . . . ; : ' ' ' :i •* present at the site 
for all phases c^ f the eon^tme'-on and excavation, including the removal oi live driveway and later 
the sidewalk, testified thai -u ..-; not >ec J a; iee! • : i-.u ; \-;v .in; .a I D : 4 - 2 4 5 7 , 
64-65. Gerald Newton n volunteer at the Centei who worked there Monday through Friday, never 
saw a defect in tr^ pa;k oii.p >...•,: w a.-: uii • -:-;,=:;r < , : . ;e- r.,p:.si' ; even 
after the incident. R.492; Newton Deposition m • : i \ line Watts, of Watts Construction, saw no 
defect or hole in. the park strip and ( u111M ;e:\ r.:.. - ;.».%>:! i. Constr uction, saw "nothing oi it of the 
ordinary" in the park strip. R.550;DeMill Deposition at In- 1 "\ R.;s *X. Watts Deposition at 9:18-20.' 
This is the evidence in tins eu.ie. hveiumng eisv r * ii, i ; .
 : 
Kreyling specifically argues, however, that the City "should have know about the hole if 
ithadproperly inspected t!u innate dir.e\\a\ \\ncii i- : • .. .M I"---I. 
semi-circle. The extension of this argument is that the semi-circle, located in the comer of the park 
strip between the edge of the gutter and the driveway ran i p, is l he lot alion and'oi "cause1* oi'the hole, 
- :e.h there is no evidence to support tin:- conjecture ("Q: hi picture No. 1. n show s concrete w ith 
kind of a half circle or a half moon cut out oi !. .-•• ;-• )o- \- : : • ; . : • *\ ;:» o, 
th 1.- •!•/* A: No, no, I don't know." R.512, Coulter Deposition at .' 5:4-24). 1 le also argues the City 
"should have known" theCounty andits contractors wen- o,;mai. i ^ ii:--, ; ,;- -ip. -\ uardle^ .-"'ru 
C *=•: >.'•-• N failure to notify the City of its encroachment, if it had properly inspected the site and the 
County's excavation work. 
T> - • -" •;: uients clearly raise the issue of the City' s immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 63-30-10(4), for failure to make an inspection or for making an inadequate inspection. Kreyling 
suggests that, had the City inspected the County's construction project and, some many years ago, 
inspected the construction of the private driveway, it would have been aware that the County or the 
homeowner had created a defect in the park strip. However, such an inspection would be intended 
to assure compliance with the various building and other safety codes, as well as City ordinances. 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 270 (Utah 1995). Such a failure to inspect or 
inadequate inspection is strictly protected from liability by the Governmental Immunity Act. "We 
thus conclude that the immunity granted in section [63-30-10(4)] was intended to immunize the 
conclusions and results of an inspection where the inspector may have overlooked something..." 
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1993). 
Kreyling argues that Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) supports the 
conclusion that summary judgment was improper. However, in Ingram^ summary judgment was 
denied because the plaintiff presented evidence that created a genuine issue of fact. The plaintiff 
claimed he was injured when he stepped on a manhole cover that collapsed under his weight. The 
plaintiff claimed the city was negligent for failing to discover the defective manhole cover. Each 
party submitted affidavits from expert witnesses regarding whether or not the defect in the manhole 
cover was discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Id. at 127-28. In this case, the Plaintiff has 
presented no evidence that would raise such an issue of fact. Kreyling has presented no evidence 
that the hole was discoverable, or even present prior to his fall. 
"[I]t is well settled that the court may not permit a jury to speculate upon the evidence and 
a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation." Olsen v. 
Warwood, 255 P.2d 725 (Utah 1953); "To defeat a motion for summary judgment, evidence, 
including testimony, must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.' " 
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' =•'.- rkina v. Jew/? Community Center (JCC), 179 Fed.Appx. 454, 455-56 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus 
"unsupported conclusory nlueations ... ur HOI -, i e.r.= -A 'Li-uiue L- - • •! *'• / J>we# v.. Univ 
of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233,123/ ^lOlhCir.2004). "The question o\w hclher the city exercised prope: 
vigilance to discover a defect depends on ihe eiemei:i •• :> •• .• • s' .' tc <•' • '-..• 1 Meet 
its prominence in location and other factors bearing on what could reasonably be expected of j 
person charged with the duty nf supervising miles of ^tieeu anu -oe^ a ..
 ; 
(in • ;. 1 uth 1947). It is apparent there is no evidence to support the factua 
conjecture argued by Mr. Kreyling and summary judgment was proper. 
C O N C L I ' S J M A 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant ("in of St. George respectfully requests ti.ai u;i< 
Court affirm the district court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Si immary Judgment 
DATED t h i s ^ / i a y of May 2003. 
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September 4, 2007. St. George, Utah. 
PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: 11 o'clock in the morning. Matter that 
we have before us is Kreyling vs. City of St. George. And, 
Mr. Olson, you are here in behalf of the plaintiff in this 
case. 
And, Miss Hutton, you are here in behalf of the city. 
Is that correct, counsel? 
MS. HUTTON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, counsel, we have before 
us a motion for summary judgment filed by the city that I'm 
not going to mince words on it, counsel. I worry about this 
kind of a case and this kind of a motion when it looks like 
we might come up to a jury issue. And I want you to give me 
an idea of why it is that you think that this should never 
get to a jury from the city's standpoint. Why shouldn't it, 
counsel? 
MS. HUTTON: Well, factually and legally speaking, 
there is absolutely no evidence that the city was aware of, 
was involved in any construction or excavation at the county 
senior center. Under the governmental immunity act, under 
landowner liability, under the special use doctrine, the 
party, the governmental entity has to either have created the 
defect or they have to have been aware of it, made aware of 
it either by the nature that it had been there for so long 
that they should have been aware of it as a property owner. 
But that has never been established. In fact, the evidence 
is to the contrary, that the city was not made aware. There 
was never any encroachment permit obtained by any of the 
contractors, including the county, that were involved in this 
construction project. 
THE COURT: Counsel, that encroachment permit 
concept, as I understand it, if ITm going to dig a hole 
anywhere that's going to impact a paved city street of the 
City of St. George, I'm in violation of law if I don't have a 
permit — 
MS. HUTTON: That's right. 
THE COURT: — to open that street. 
MS. HUTTON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And, without that permit, it's pretty 
darn hard to show that the city had any knowledge of this at 
all. 
MS. HUTTON: That's correct. And the only 
encroachment permit — everyone who testified, Bob Coulter 
from the county, Curtis DeMille for DeMille Construction, 
Eric Watts for Watts Construction, they all testified that 
they have done construction digging in that area. Now, I'm 
not saying there is any evidence that it was in a specific 
area where the alleged hole is, because no one really knows 
for sure. But they all testified that nobody got an 
4 
encroachment permit. 
Now, Curtis DeMille produced very recently an 
encroachment permit for trenching in the road to put in an 
8-inch water main for fire prevention. That was done 
November 18th of 2003. But that was well after the alleged 
period of time. 
THE COURT: Separate and apart from this plaintiff's 
injuries. 
MS, HUTTON: Exactly. There was no permit. They all 
testified that they have responsibility to remove water 
meters. The meter setters remove and count water lines, 
sewer lines. But no one obtained an encroachment permit. 
And the defect is not even clearly defined. We are not 
really sure where it was, what caused it, how it occurred. 
There is no question from the photographs that were provided 
by the county that sometimes when they began their 
construction and removed those four homes for purposes of 
construction that they also -- there's a telephone pole that 
everyone draws your attention to. On either side of this 
telephone pole, were driveways. One driveway went into a 
private residence. The other driveway went in behind the 
senior center. 
At the time the county began their construction, Bob 
Coulter, who is the building superintendent for the county, 
he testified that those driveways were excavated by the 
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1 county back to the sidewalk. Photographs confirm that the 
2 driveway that the plaintiff was actually standing on, and he 
3 1 took photographs of, that was excavated back to the sidewalk. 
4| But the one on the other side of the telephone pole, which is 
5 directly in this area that the plaintiffs been complaining 
6 1 about, was excavated all the way to the curb. And you can 
7 I see it in the photographs. 
8 I I actually sent you some additional photographs that 
9 are a lot more — 
10 I THE COURT: I have them right here, counsel. 
11 -MS. HUTTON: -- a lot more legible. I was concerned 
12I about how well the other ones would show you what was 
13 1 actually occurring. The first — there's a photograph in 
14 1 there marked Washington County 008, Washington County 009. 
15 1 Those show those driveways in place, one on either side of 
16 1 the telephone pole. They were — can you see that? 
17 1 THE COURT: Got it. 
18 1 MS. HUTTON: Okay. If you go to the next one down, 
19 1 which is marked 0007, the bottom photograph — 
20I THE COURT: Right. 
21 I MS. HUTTON: -- you can see that the sidewalk is gone 
22 1 between — I mean, not sidewalk, the driveway. The driveway 
23I has been excavated all the way to the curb. 
24I THE COURT: In fact, it appears that the only thing 
25I remaining of that driveway surface is the actual culvert top, 
if you want to call it that, from the blacktop to the top of 
the curb. 
MS. HUTTON: Exactly. The gutter. That's all that 
is left. So, clearly, with respect to all three of the 
theories of immunity that the city has asserted, in order to 
establish that we were not immune, the plaintiff would have 
to establish that we in some way had some knowledge of this 
defect which can not be established. In fact, Mr. Kreyling 
testified that he parked in this same area from two to as 
many as four times a week. During that time — well, what 
his statement was, "I parked there dozens of times and never 
noticed a hole. It looked like solid dirt." 
Bob Coulter testified that he saw it after he heard 
someone had fallen there. Hefs not sure of the time period, 
because even the plaintiff!s a little faulty about when he 
actually fell. Bob Coulter testified there was no hole. It 
was just a dished out area. Gerald Newton, who is a 
volunteer for the senior center and who was at the senior 
center five days a week, he testified that it was just a 
rough dirt area with lots of leaves everywhere. 
Curtis DeMille, who is the president of DeMille 
Construction, he testified that he looked at the area, and 
there was nothing out of the ordinary. 
In the plaintiff's responses to interrogatories, the 
plaintiff states — well, actually, in response to the city's 
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l! statement of facts, at paragraph 12 he admits, in responding to 
2 1 the city's motion for summary judgment, that he saw this area 
3 I as many as four times a week and never noticed a hole. So, 
4 1 there's no way that the city could have been aware unless they 
5 1 were made aware. If people who were there four or five times a 
6 1 week were unaware of it without the encroachment permit, there 
7 J is no way that the city would have any idea that anything had 
8 1 happened to the park strip. 
9 1 THE COURT: Well, counsel, I guess my real concern 
10 I is, if I look at your photograph sheet that you have supplied 
11 I me, the lower right hand designation you put on it is Exhibit 
12 I B, and quote, close quote, reply, I see$ the cones around 
13 1 this hole and ground. And I see — there's probably a term 
14 1 of art that described this particular critter -- but it's one 
15 I of those — 
16 MS. HUTTON: Divot? 
17 I THE COURT: — one of those delineator markers with a 
18 1 heavy bottom on it that has toppled over into the hole. And 
19 1 the hole, if I've got the scale right, looking at the 
20I infamous telephone pole as well as the person who is standing 
21 I next to it at the top — 
22 MS. HUTTON: Um-hmm, yes. 
23 THE COURT: — that hole appears to be, I would say 
24 I 18 to 20 inches deep. It's just your position that no 
25 I encroachment permit, no other statement of any kind in any 
record, any place, gave the city notice that there was that 
hole next to that street in that location by the telephone 
pole? 
MS. HUTTON: That's correct. Also, what you are 
seeing in those photographs -- those are the photographs that 
the plaintiff took. Those photographs are after the sidewalk 
and curb and everything was removed. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. HUTTON: We don't have any idea really what it 
looked like at the time that the plaintiff alleged he was 
there. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible.) 
MS. HUTTON: Now, there is testimony that the dished 
out area that Mr. Coulter looked at was about nine inches 
deep. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, this excavation that we have 
here is after the fact. 
MS. HUTTON: Um-hmm. 
THE COURT: By — has anybody been able to establish 
how far after the fact, how many days or weeks after the 
fact? 
MS. HUTTON: Well, according to the most recent 
production that was made by DeMille — and I just got this a 
couple weeks ago — they have made a change in his deposition 
transcript. And he states in his deposition where he's made 
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these changes that the sidewalk was removed on November 19th. 
Now, that would mean that that photograph that you are 
holding was taken sometime after November 19th. But I have 
no way to confirm or deny that other than this statement that 
was made by Mr. DeMille that the sidewalk wasn't removed 
until --
THE COURT: Mr. Kreyling's injury was in — 
MS. HUTTON: He states, well, sometime between 
September 3rd and September 10th. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, this would have been at least 
30 and maybe as many as 40 days after? 
MS. HUTTON: And he does testify in his deposition 
he being Mr. Kreyling, that he took the photographs two or 
three weeks later. So, we know it's after November 19th. 
That looks like a pretty nice day for it to be November 19th, 
almost Thanksgiving, but --
THE COURT: Well, in St. George all (inaudible), 
counsel. 
MS. HUTTON: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Well, counsel, I guess you know what my 
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you have been through, that the grounds that you have; that 
is, no encroachment permit, no notice, no proof of any notice 
that the St. George City's immunity simply is established? 
MS. HUTTON: That's correct. And also, I want to 
point out that the supreme court of the Utah State in 
Gullible [phonetic] vs. Salt Lake Southern Railroad, citing 
to Schnop House vs. Storehouse, it's one of those slip and 
falls, 2004. "It's usually held that fault can not be 
imputed to the defendant unless the plaintiff demonstrates, 
one, that the defendant had knowledge of the condition; and, 
two, that after such knowledge sufficient time had elapsed 
that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have 
remedied it." 
THE COURT: It's the old law school example of green 
bean slip and fall in a grocery store case. 
MS. HUTTON: Exactly. But they go on to cite to 
Deets vs. Commercial Security Bank, which — stating that — 
and that's a case where the plaintiff slipped and fell on the 
employer's icy parking terrace. And the courts said that the 
plaintiff testified in her deposition that she knew that 
there was ice on the terrace. And she also knew that there 
was alternative parking available. Therefore, fault could 
not be imputed to the employer because she didn't have to 
walk across the icy parking lot. 
The same can be argued here regardless of whether 
it's the city or one of the construction companies. The 
plaintiff testified that he was -- I mean, he was aware of 
the construction. He had been parking there. He just 
assumed that it was okay, because there were no cones, there 
was no fence. There was no barricade, which is also required 
by ordinance to be put up. And because of that, although he 
knew there was construction there, he didn't think that it 
was unsafe. He also testified that he knew that there was 
alternative parking. But he particularly liked this place 
because of the driveway ramp that made it easier for him to 
get his wife across the gutter and onto the sidewalk. So, 
the county was inviting its citizens to utilize this ramp in 
a manner that actually exposed them to this construction 
site. And without even putting up a barricade. 
THE COURT: And, counsel, concomitant with the 
encroachment permit is the hole barricade warning system set 
up within the county ordinance, mandating, if you are going 
to cut our streets and put holes in them, you have to let the 
public know. 
MS. HUTTON: That's correct. In fact, the ordinance 
says that if the barricade has to be in place until that area 
is restored to its previous or similar to previous condition. 
So, there should have been something there to --
THE COURT: Mess with our grade, you better barricade 
it until it's back to the way it was. 
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MS. HUTTON: Exactly. And Bob Coulter testified that 
the reason they didn't do that was because it was 
particularly inconvenient when they were moving big trucks 
back and forth out of the site with this debris and other 
materials. And, you know, I understand that's always one of 
the construction problems. But they had an active facility 
right next door that was parking increasingly close to this 
construction site. In fact, you can tell from the 
photographs they couldn't have gotten much closer from using 
this particular ramp. Which also brings up the theory of the 
special use doctrine. The plaintiff argued against special 
use because the case that Rose vs. Provo City basically said 
that the liability of the private property owner using the 
park strip for a special purpose did not automatically make 
the city immune because they still had knowledge of this, if 
they had knowledge or had created the same issue that comes 
up in the latent defect argument. The difference between 
Rose and our case is that in Rose, Provo City had actually 
dug up the park strip themselves. In fact, they had dug up 
the park strip on at least two occasions to replace a pipe, 
some kind of a drainage pipe. Rose, or the property owner 
that was also involved in the case, he had called, he had 
documentation that he had called the city and recorded his 
special use. And he had called and reported that they had 
made it hazardous by digging it up. So, he could establish 
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1 I that the city had the awareness that can not be established 
2 1 here. So, for the special use doctrine, there is — there is 
3 1 no evidence that the city created this hazard. But there is 
4 J evidence the county was aware of this special use that was 
5 1 being made of these driveways. 
6I THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Olson, if I rule in favor of 
7I the city, what are you going to tell the court of appeals 
8I that I have erred on? 
9 1 MR. OLSON: Well, I think the first thing I would 
10 1 like to do for you, Your Honor, is to make sure we do have 
111 the facts a little bit straight. You are looking at the 
12 1 pictures, one of which depicts my client pointing at the 
13I ground. That's the pictures that shows the excavation and 
14 1 that sort of thing. And I think it's understood that those 
15 J pictures were taken several weeks after the fall and after 
16I excavation. So, you know, the excavation is apparent in 
17I those pictures. Although, it's the same area, that 
18 1 excavation wasn't there. So, when the court says, hey, that 
19 1 looks like a 8, 9-inch dip there, that's not really the 
20 1 issue. In fact, that's where our biggest dispute of fact 
211 takes place is the nature of this hole. My client's 
22 1 testimony is that he stepped into a cylindrical hole that fit 
23 his entire leg, and he was still not touching bottom. He 
24 went into his groin, not touching bottom. The city's put 
25I forth undisputed facts that says it was a depression. It was 
1] a nine-inch hole. It was this and that. No, it clearly 
2I wasn't. 
3 1 Mr. Kreyling's deposition is, I stepped into that 
4 1 thing up to my groin. And I wasn't touching bottom. Of 
5 1 course, (inaudible) at the city, if you look at my client's 
6 1 picture, he doesn't have much of an inseam but, nonetheless, 
7 1 it was much more than nine inches. 
8 1 THE COURT: Neither do I, counsel. I'll give the 
9 J city that break. 
10 J MR. OLSON: So, I think it is important that there is 
11 I that dispute of fact from the nature of the hole from the 
12I get-go. 
13 1 Now, looking at this thing, one thing the city really 
14 1 hasn't argued today that it certainly argued in the motion, is 
15 1 that there are city ordinances that require abutting property 
16 1 owner to keep property in good condition. Well, the problem 
17 I with that city ordinance is that there is also significant case 
18I law that says the entity has a non-delegable duty to maintain 
19 1 the streets and sidewalks. That's Ingram vs. Salt Lake City. 
20I THE COURT: But, counsel, if I were the owner of a 
21 backhoe, sometimes I wish I was, but I'm not, and I went to 
22 1 the city street in front of my old house, which was in St. 
23 1 George, my new house is in Ivins. But if I went to my old 
24 house and just decided to dig into the street out there 
25 because I didn't like the way my water line seemed to be 
leaking, if I don't file a permit request and be granted that 
encroachment permit, how is the city going to know that I 
have put a hole in their street until one of their squad cars 
drops in it or one of their garbage trucks falls in it and 
they get a call from the garbage contractor that says you 
have hole in front of this house? How is the city going to 
know? 
MR. OLSON: Sure. And I understand what you are 
saying. I think the first thing to understand is that it's 
not a standard action notice. Itfs a standard or knew or 
should have known. So that the lack of encroachment permit 
in itself doesn't say, hey, latent defect. They don't get to 
stand up and say, hey, we didn't know anything about it. 
There wasn't an encroachment permit. Using your example, 
let's say the city rise by that hole in the street, through 
its officers, agents, whoever it may be for five months and 
says no encroachment permit. We are not liable. That's just 
not the way it works. It's a knew or should have known 
standard. 
THE COURT: Counsel, let's look at the factual basis 
around your client's injury, of the should have known side of 
it. It's your client's position that, certainly, when he 
took the photographs that are in the record now, what we have 
been looking at, on or about the 19th of November at the 
earliest day, that, certainly, anybody driving by that should 
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1 have known. And the city should have known by that time that 
2 there was a hole there. But let's go back to the time of the 
3 injury, somewhere in the range of mid-September, let's say. 
4 What facts can you point me to that are in the record that 
5 support that "should have known" that make me want to give 
6 J this to a jury and let them make that decision? 
7 J MR. OLSON: Sure, Your Honor. And, of course, I 
8 I think one of the things that is important to understand, 
9 J there are not indicators that this hole was created at the 
10I time the county began its construction on the senior center. 
Ill In fact, there is not a lot of indicators as to when this 
12 1 hole was created but for the fact that we have a driveway 
13 J that was poured going into what was an old LDS Church and 
14 J then was owned by the county and used as a senior center, 
15 1 presumably a driveway, I'm making assumptions, was there when 
16 1 the church went in. It goes through the back parking lot. 
17 I But if you look at the pictures that contain my client and 
18 1 what he's pointing to, you see a half circle cut out of the 
19 1 driveway that went around something that once was there that 
20 became a hole. In fact, if we look at that half circle and 
21 the discoloration of dirt, my client's testimony is that's 
22 where the hole was. So, at some point in time, whether there 
23 was encroachment permit or otherwise, there is a driveway 
24 I poured across the city's property going around an object that 
25 at least came up to the ground in order for concrete to form 
around it. And, at some point in time, that object was 
removed. 
Now, we have the double-edged sword of they say, 
well, it's latent because when plaintiff, you know, walked 
into it he didn't see it. It was covered with cobwebs. It 
was covered with leaves. It was covered with this and that. 
You know, obviously, if he saw it he wouldn't have stepped 
into it. But it goes back to the old law school case you are 
referring of, the typical case of a slip in a grocery store. 
I always refer to it as the banana peel case. And you look 
at it and say, how brown was the banana peel? That's how we 
know how long it was sitting there. 
THE COURT: Or whether or not it got into the 
petrified stage. 
MR. OLSON: Exactly. Exactly. So, we have a hole 
that's been there long enough for leaves and cobwebs and that 
sort of thing to form.we've got a driveway that has been 
there for a very long time that was poured around something 
that was there. But you are right, we are not terribly sure 
what was pulled out to cause that hole. What we do know, it 
was a deep cylindrical hole. And it was very close to a 
walking area. 
So, I think what's important for the court to ask 
itself, and I think that the court had it well under hand when 
you first looked at it. The biggest hurdle in this case is the 
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city is asking for summary judgment on what is, essentially, a 
standard of reasonableness. And if we look at the definition 
of latent defect, and that's what's required to get the 
immunity, it's one in which reasonable care upon full 
inspection would not reveal. It's reasonable care upon 
inspection. So, it's a question of reasonableness or question 
of negligence. 
If we look at the — there's a case called Pig's Gun 
Club vs. Sanpete County. It says, "Determination of latent. 
The definition of "latent" is for a finder of fact." We will 
get — the other case was Bowen vs. Riverton City. "Summary 
judgments are more frequently given in contract cases. 
However, when it comes to determining negligence, 
contributory negligence and causation, courts are not in such 
a good position to make a total determination, for here 
enters a prerogative of the jury to make a determination of 
its own. And that is, did the conduct of a party measure up 
to that of a reasonably prudent man and, if not, was it a 
proximate cause of the harm done?" 
If we look at the Ingram vs. Salt Lake City case, that 
was a manhole case where someone, you know, fell into something 
that was either a defective lid or open or something like that. 
It state's, "What constitutes a defective, unsafe or dangerous 
condition of a parkway where a latent defect of a water meter 
lid presents a question of fact that is properly answered by a 
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jury." 
So, we are really left with a situation, Your Honor, 
where you are going to have to make a judgment call if you 
rule today, that this defect would not have been found upon 
reasonable inspection. 
That's the judgment that would have to be made today. 
And I would assert to you, number one, that we've got a big 
dispute of fact as to what the nature of this hole was in the 
first place. That, yet, to take the next step and determine 
would it have been discovered upon reasonable inspection. 
THE COURT: Well, counsel, are we going to call the 
directors of the streets departments from Washington City, 
Santa Clara City, Ivins City, St. George City, Hurricane City 
and have them all come in and testify as to how they inspect 
their streets to determine whether or not St. George City was 
reasonable in its treatment of this location where the injury 
occurred? 
MR. OLSON: I guess what I would assert to that, Your 
Honor, is it's not a question of how much inspection is 
reasonable. It's a question of -- or even what kind of 
inspection is reasonable. Rather, it!s a question on if they 
reasonably inspected the property, would they have noticed? 
So, it's not a question of, well, they had a duty to come out 
and inspect their streets and sidewalks every other day. 
That's really not the issue. The issue is, if they had given 
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1 it a reasonable inspection, would they have noticed it? And 
2 that goes to a question of the reasonable man viewing this 
3 property, would you have noticed the defect upon a reasonable 
4 inspection. 
5 1 THE COURT: Counsel, you are the moving party. You 
6I do get last say. 
7 1 MS. HUTTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Well, in 
8 J response to that, I would have to remind the court that all 
9 of the evidence, and we are talking about testimony after the 
10I fact, 20/20 hindsight, all of these witnesses said even 
11I knowing that someone had fallen, we didn't see a hole. 
12I Mr. Kreyling himself parked there every day. He made 
13] a better inspection than the city is going to do. I mean, 
14I absent going around sticking a pole in the ground throughout 
15 1 St. George City, we are not going to know what's going to 
16 J cave in. We don't know what this hole looked like before. 
17 1 Now, the photographs, the photographs in hj*re, they 
18 J show this property. And the photographs are actually dated. 
19 The photograph was taken February 2002 — February 7th, 2002. 
20 1 You can see the telephone pole. That's the one that's marked 
21 WC008. 
22 THE COURT: And there is no indication of any round 
23 1 object being placed inside the hole there. 
24 MS. HUTTON: There is nothing there. Plus, this 
25 location that is being pointed to is right at the seam of the 
II curb and the driveway. I mean right in the corner there. 
2 Other than the possibility now, you know, for a possibility, 
3 I the county, apparently, did use this property. And there's 
4 J this, these photographs where the County Sheriff's Office is 
5 using this property for some type of maneuvers. I don't know 
6 1 what they are. And they have barricaded this. Whether or 
7 1 not in order to do that, if that's WC005, whether or not — 
8I do you have that there? 
91 THE COURT: Let me take a look at what you've got. 
10 J MS. HUTTON: The fact of the matter i s , we just don't 
111 know — he definitely has this picture. 
12 J THE COURT: Oh, that's just a SWAT team working out, 
13 I counsel. 
14 1 MS. HUTTON: Well, yeah. 
15 J THE COURT: We have seen a lot of them. 
16 J MS. HUTTON: And they have put in some post and 
17 J drapes, some crime scene tape there. And we know that that 
18 J occurred before the construction occurred because the houses 
19 I are there. 
201 "The United States Supreme Court has held on several 
J21 occasions that the non-movement — nonmovant must produce 
22 I evidence in support of his claim that creates a genuine issue 
23 for trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 
24I to the nonmovant, it is not enough that the evidence is 
25 1 merely colorable or anything short of significantly probative 
1 to defeat summary judgment." That's Anderson vs. Liberty 
2 Lobby. "This is because when the record taken as a whole 
3 I could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 
nonmoving party there is no genuine issue. Once the movant 
points out an absence of proof on essential element of the 
6 I nonmovant's case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to 
7 1 provide evidence to the contrary." 
8 1 That just can not be done here. There is no evidence 
9 I that the City of St. George created a hole there. And there 
10 is no evidence that they knew or should have known that there 
11] was any defect in this park strip. And I would request that 
12 1 summary judgment be granted on behalf of the city. 
131 THE COURT: Your motion is granted, counsel. I'm 
14 I just satisfied on the basis of this record that as a matter 
15 1 of law under these facts one can not stretch liability to the 
16 City of St. George. 
17 1 If you'll prepare an order to that effect, circulate 
18 1 it under the rules, and I'll sign it when I get it. Thank 
19 1 you, counsel. And I'm going to give you your courtesy copies 
































STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING 
PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BEFORE ME, RUSSEL D. MORGAN, A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF 
UTAH, RESIDING AT WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH; 
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE TAKEN BY ME 
IN STENOTYPE FROM AN ELECTRONIC RECORDING, AND 
THEREAFTER CAUSED BY ME TO BE TRANSCRIBED INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION 
OF SAID TESTIMONY SO TAKEN AND TRANSCRIBED TO THE BEST 
OF MY ABILITY IS SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING PAGES 
NUMBERED FROM 3 TO 23 INCLUSIVE. 
RUSSEL D. MORGAN, CSR 
LICENSE #87-108442-7801 
DECEMBER 10, 2007 
ADDENDUM "B 
Linette B. Hutton (#6408) 
Dennis Flynn (#10399) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
P.O. Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Facsimile (801) 322-2282 
Attorneys for Defendant City of St. George 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
JULE W. KREYLING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, et at, 
Defendants. 
RICHARD WATTS CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., d/b/a WATTS CONSTRUCTION 
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ST. 
GEORGE CITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 050501129 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CURTIS DEMILLE CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., a Utah Corporation 
Third-Party Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on September 4,2007 on Defendant City of St. 
George's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by Brian L. Olson of Gallian, 
4233 003 
Wilcox, Welker & Olson and Defendant City of St. George by Linette B. Hutton, of Winder & Haslam. 
Following oral argument from counsel, the Court's examination of the pleadings and being fully advised 
in the premises, the Court finds there is no probative evidence that the City of St. George created the 
defect or condition in the park strip, or knew or should have known of any defect or condition. Therefore, 
the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant City of St. George's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 7 day of SepSsSer 2007. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable JAMES L. SHUMATE 
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